The fog of war, Carl von Clausewitz wrote, often obscures what is really happening on the battlefield. That fog may be especially thick right now in the Persian Gulf, where President Trump has spent weeks threatening a massive strike on Iran, only to pull back at the last minute in hopes of a diplomatic breakthrough. But according to Kenneth R. Timmerman, a senior fellow at the America First Policy Institute, the core reason for this fight is clear: Iran’s nuclear program.
In a new essay for American Thinker, Timmerman writes that the war is being fought over two main U.S. goals: the unconditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the end of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. So far, he argues, neither has been achieved—and Tehran keeps escalating.
The ‘sweet spot’ that isn’t working
Timmerman describes Trump’s approach as a search for a “sweet spot”—applying just enough military pressure to force Iran to negotiate seriously, without inflicting what the president sees as excessive and long-term damage. The problem, Timmerman says, is that so far the Iranians have responded to every U.S. restraint with more aggression: more missile and drone strikes, more attacks by proxies on Gulf allies, and more irredentist demands.
The latest provocation, he notes, was a claim by the Iranian parliament that Tehran had reached an agreement with Oman over joint control of the Strait. Under the alleged deal, Iran would impose a 5% to 7% toll on ships transiting the strait, generating an estimated $385 million per day for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—money Timmerman says would fund oppression at home, more drones and missiles, and proxy wars abroad. The deal would reportedly bar ships from the United States, Israel, and any other country opposing the “Axis of Resistance,” which would also block Saudi Arabian ships given the kingdom’s long war with the Houthis.
For Timmerman, such an arrangement is not just unacceptable—it’s outrageous.
The forgotten mines
Amid the negotiations and headlines, Timmerman argues that the world may have lost sight of why the Strait of Hormuz is closed in the first place. Iran mined the customary passageways in the middle of the strait at the start of the war, and those mines have never been removed. That’s why the discussion has centered on alternative routes: the “northern route” through Iranian territorial waters and the “southern route” via Oman.
The historic passageway runs through international waters, Timmerman writes, but Iran closed it—an act of war that, in his view, violates the UN Law of the Sea Treaty and should have triggered a unified international response led by the UN Security Council. Yet that response never came. According to Timmerman, the United States did try to invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which authorizes “all necessary measures” including military action, but Russia and China threatened to veto any resolution against Iran. Britain and France initially agreed to join an international mine-sweeping force, only to back out when it became clear the IRGC would attack any ships attempting to clear the mines.
“So much for the international ‘order,'” Timmerman writes. “And so much for our allies.”
The nuclear question that won’t go away
Even if the Strait of Hormuz could be reopened tomorrow, Timmerman insists that the second U.S. demand—ending Iran’s nuclear ambitions—is the one that can’t be walked away from. He points to recent comments from IRGC Chief Ahmad Vahidi, who reportedly said Iran would continue developing nuclear weapons as long as the United States and Israel have them. A subsequent Iranian commentator offered a softer translation, but Timmerman dismisses the distinction. “In IRGC-speak, that means exactly the same thing,” he writes.
Whether Vahidi’s exact words are confirmed or not, Timmerman says there is “no other explanation” for Iran’s massive spending on uranium enrichment, its buried nuclear sites, its refusal to discuss its nuclear program, or recent revelations about a site known as Mount Kalang, or “Pickaxe Mountain.” He warns that if the IRGC had operational nuclear warheads, they would likely be used against Israel or the United States—whether through direct attacks or in EMP mode to destroy America’s electrical grid and send the country back to a pre-industrial era.
Timmerman reminds readers that this is a regime that has already threatened to wipe Israel off the map and has demonstrated a willingness to destroy the civilian infrastructure of its Persian Gulf neighbors, including desalination plants.
His conclusion is stark: “If anyone has any doubts as to why we are fighting this war, just think of what the IRGC would do if it actually had operational nuclear warheads.”
The article reflects a particular viewpoint—one that strongly supports the Trump administration’s military posture and is deeply skeptical of Iran’s intentions. But it captures a central tension driving U.S. policy in the region: how to balance the use of force with the risk of escalation, and whether any diplomatic path can solve the nuclear problem when the other side seems unwilling to give it up.
Source: www.americanthinker.com — https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2026/08/why-we-fight/